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THE UNITED STATES’ RELATIONSHIP WITH THE INSANITY DEFENSE BEFORE AND 
AFTER UNITED STATES v. HINCKLEY 
 
 
The United States is never as united in thought as after a national tragedy.  This rang true 
after John Hinckley, Jr. attempted to assassinate President Ronald Reagan in 1981.  When 
Hinckley was found to be not guilty by reason of insanity, Americans made their anger known.   
How dare such an attack occur on American soil!  Suddenly, the enemy became the insanity 
defense itself, rather than the evil that caused the crimes committed.  While these kinds of 
ideological shifts can be expected as society progresses and adjusts to circumstances, American 
society cannot be trusted to act rationally; it is still important to understand the underlying 
reasons for these changes to ensure that history is not shaped by overly biased and flawed 
thinking.  Though the insanity defense has been used in legal procedures for decades, the United 
States’ view of it has shifted due to the circumstances surrounding specific cases.  This change 
was especially evident before and after the case of United States v. Hinckley.  Previously, a 1954 
case called Durham v. United States had established what became known as the Durham Rule, 
which stated that “an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the product of 
mental disease or defect” and was intended to help determine whether or not a plea of insanity 
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was valid.1  By creating a distinction between simply the presence of a mental illness and it being 
the cause of the unlawful act, the Durham Rule attempted to improve the process of criminal 
proceedings; however, it soon proved too vague and generalized to be effective.  Despite the lack 
of widespread use of the Durham Rule after its adoption, it demonstrated the point-of-view of the 
Supreme Court regarding the insanity defense at the time of the case.  The United States only 
became wary of this defense when a wave of mental health reform changed the way those found 
guilty by reason of insanity were treated; instead of being institutionalized, mentally ill people 
were given treatment, and American society was not satisfied without seeing some level of 
punishment.   
John Hinckley, Jr. was born on May 29, 1955 in Ardmore, Oklahoma.  Obsessed with 
actress Jodie Foster despite being seven years older than her, he stalked her for a period of time 
and claimed his assassination attempt of President Ronald Reagan was partially inspired by the 
movie Taxi Driver, in which a character makes an assassination attempt on a United States 
senator.  In a letter to Foster before his crime, he wrote that he “would abandon this idea of 
getting Reagan in a second if I could only win your heart and live out the rest of my life with 
you, whether it be in total obscurity or whatever.”2  Along with demonstrating in part his 
motivation, the letter attempted to push the blame onto this woman Hinckley had been stalking.  
Though Hinckley’s most well-known crime would not be committed until 1981, he was also 
arrested at the Nashville International Airport on October 9, 1980 for possession of three 
                                                          
1 Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). 
2 John Hinckley, Jr, “John Hinckley’s Letter to Jodie Foster Written Immediately Before 
Assassination,” in Famous Trials, ed. Professor Douglas O. Linder.    
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firearms.  President Jimmy Carter had also been in Nashville on that day, foreshadowing for 
Hinckley’s assassination attempt the following year.   
 On March 30, 1981, President Reagan was leaving the Hilton Hotel in Washington, D.C. 
when John Hinckley, Jr. began shooting at him from the surrounding crowd.  The President, 
Press Secretary James Brady, police officer Thomas K. Delahanty, and Secret Service agent 
Timothy J. McCarthy, were all injured, but none were killed.  Hinckley was taken into custody 
almost immediately, but tried to commit suicide twice between the event and the beginning of his 
trial in May 1982.  He insisted that Jodie Foster testify in his trial, saying he planned to refuse to 
cooperate in his own defense if she did not.  While he was excited to be present during the 
filming of testimony, he became angry when she paid no attention to him and was escorted from 
the room; this reinforced the warped, entitled obsession that Hinckley had with Foster.3 The jury 
selection process narrowed ninety potential jurors down to twelve people: eleven black and one 
white, seven women and five men.   
 The first part of the trial answered the easier question, whether or not John Hinckley, Jr. 
had fired the shots at President Reagan.  This was uncontested by the defense, as the evidence 
and witnesses immediately contradicted any denial, and the defense wanted to avoid appearing 
untrustworthy from the beginning.  Once this matter was settled, the second phase of the trial to 
determine insanity began.  Hinckley’s parents were questioned about their son’s childhood, as 
well as aspects of the timeline that did not appear to add up.  In 1980, Hinckley had overdosed 
on antidepressant medication, leading his parents to send him to meet with Dr. John Hopper, a 
local psychiatrist.  He testified about Hinckley’s very apparent history of mental illness, 
                                                          
3 “Hinckley Stirred to an Outburst,” New York Times, CXXXI: 45,346 (June 16, 1982), 
sec. I, 13.   
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correcting his past lack of legitimate diagnosis and citing an autobiography by the defendant in 
which he wrote that his mind was “on the breaking point.”  The doctor explained that because he 
had relied too much on his in-person interactions with Hinckley and disregarded many warning 
signs in his writing, his past dismissal of symptoms was unreliable.  Hinckley’s behavior and 
mental state was not one of a healthy young man, and the events of the previous several years 
illustrated this. 
 Along with Dr. John Hopper, the leading psychiatrist for the defense was Dr. William 
Carpenter, who concluded that John Hinckley, Jr. suffered from schizophrenia after forty-five 
hours of conversation with him.  He asserted that Hinckley possessed several symptoms of the 
mental disorder, including depression, suicidal thoughts, withdrawal from social contacts, 
eccentric thoughts, and lack of conviction in his identity.  These identity issues caused him to 
draw personality traits from media and pop culture, leading to his obsessions with Taxi Driver 
and John Lennon.  Additionally, Hinckley could intellectually understand the problems with his 
actions in a legal sense, but he did not feel them emotionally.  This collection of symptoms 
pointed toward schizophrenia in the mind of Dr. William Carpenter. 
 Dr. David Bear, another psychiatrist, agreed with Dr. Carpenter’s diagnosis, adding that it 
was unlikely that Hinckley was faking these symptoms due to the presence of only “negative” 
signs (those faking were likely to include seemingly “positive” signs, such as seeing visions).  In 
addition to this, he used a CAT scan to show that Hinckley had widened sulci (grooves in the 
brain); because one-third of schizophrenics have wide sulci and only 2% of the normal 
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population do, this was used as evidence that Hinckley was very likely to have the mental 
disorder.4 
 The prosecution attempted to draw the attention back to the events of Hinckley’s crime, 
and Dr. Park Dietz of the government psychiatry team shared his own diagnosis of the defendant: 
a bored, lazy, manipulative kid, surely suffering from several personality disorders, but nowhere 
near psychotic or insane.  Dr. Dietz interpreted all evidence differently than the defense, even 
claiming that Hinckley’s interest in Jodie Foster was not an obsession and rather a star-struck 
infatuation.  The prosecution’s decision to frame Hinckley’s behavior as simply normal and what 
then-nineteen-year-old Foster should have expected was incredibly harmful, and had the effect of 
placing more blame on Foster for feeling threatened than on Hinckley, who had stalked and 
written about her for months.   
 The jury was then given the task of either proving that Hinckley was sane on the day of 
the attempted assassination, or deciding that he was not guilty.  Based on the testimonies as well 
as the evidence presented in the trial, the jury deemed John Hinckley, Jr. not guilty by reason of 
insanity for all thirteen counts.   
Within a month, both houses of Congress were holding hearings on the insanity defense 
and proposing measures to shift the burden of providing proof of insanity to the defense rather 
than the prosecution.  When the New York Times reported on the failure of a 1984 bill intended 
to curb the insanity defense, a distinction was made between those for and against the bill.  
Those supporting the bill were mainly Democrats, and the opposition was mainly Republican: 
“They were angered by a rule that limited debate and amendments on the House floor, and they 
                                                          
4 “Judge Rebukes Hinckley Witness Over CAT Scan,” New York Times, CXXXI: 45,319 
(May 20, 1982), sec. II, 13.   
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said the bill had several flaws, including that it did not go far enough in curbing the 
defense.”5 Based on this report, it can be concluded that the failure of the bills in Congress was 
not because representatives disagreed on limiting the insanity defense, but rather that they 
disagreed on how it should be limited.  Many states passed laws related to the case as well, with 
some creating a new verdict of “guilty but mentally ill” and Utah banning the insanity defense 
entirely.   
In 2011, New York Times journalist Lincoln Caplan revisited the responses to the 
Hinckley trial, referring to the American public’s response as “furious.”6  Interestingly, Caplan 
appeared to attribute the irrationally introduced bills simply to misinformation, stating that “A 
generation later, we know this retrenchment was based on misconceptions, above all that the 
defense was commonly, and successfully, used.”7  By stating so matter-of-factly that the insanity 
defense was only successful because the jury did not understand the rarity of its use, Caplan 
emphasized the importance of American society’s view of the outcome.  Though Hinckley was 
sent to St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in Washington and kept there until he was proven to no longer be 
a threat, Americans were outraged over simply the concept of someone working through their 
mental illness rather than being put in prison.   
 During his stay at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital, he received treatment and therapy for 
schizophrenia, remaining under close watch of doctors for years.  In February 1983, Hinckley 
                                                          
5 “House Won’t Limit Insanity Defense,” New York Times, CXXXIV: 46,172 (September 
19, 1984), sec. I, 22.  
 
6 “The Insanity Defense, Post-Hinckley,” New York Times, CLX: 55,276 (January 17, 
2011), sec. I, 24. 
 




attempted suicide for a third time since the attempted assassination, but his doctors reported his 
condition to be in full remission in 1985.  He was not allowed to make supervised trips out of the 
hospital until 1999, and in 2000, hospital representatives withdrew their recommendation for 
unsupervised visits to Hinckley’s parents’ home after learning of his continued interest in violent 
media.  It was not until September 2016 that he was officially released from St. Elizabeth’s 
Hospital, and though he was permitted to live alone on November 16, 2018 by a federal judge, he 
remains in contact with doctors and is required to attend both individual and group therapy.8  The 
goal of this progression of events was not to simply keep a threat away from the population, but 
to hopefully get rid of the threat itself.  
 The insanity defense’s use and span leading up to the Hinckley trial has varied in various 
aspects.  In Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, Or Forensic Psychiatry, S. V. Clevenger’s 1898 
examination of the intersection between psychology and law, Clevenger stated his awareness that 
the flawed nature of scientific theory surrounding insanity tainted any thought of the insanity 
defense:  
Insanity in general, its causes, nature, pathology, and treatment, are incomparably 
better understood than when the older works on medical jurisprudence were 
written; and, inevitably, whenever the law has proved laggard in keeping step 
with alienistic science there can be greater expectation of future legal adjustment 
to late discoveries and elucidations through a spread of information as to what 
constitutes such knowledge.9 
 
                                                          
8 CNN, “John Hinckley Jr. Fast Facts,” CNN Library, Updated December 5, 2018. 
 
9 S. V. Clevenger, Medical Jurisprudence of Insanity, Or Forensic Psychiatry, 1st ed. 




Because this particular aspect of legal theory required remaining up-to-date on constantly 
changing scientific viewpoints and discoveries, it could not be expected to be a valid defense.  
While some have argued that this fact itself is the reason why the insanity defense is unreliable 
and invalid, Clevenger’s view was much more optimistic; he argued that “the universal relativity 
of things makes exact definitions of impossibility,” and the futility in attempting to objectively 
define insanity should not be a barrier to trying.10  The word “insanity” originated in the 16th 
century, evolving from the Latin insanus.11  However, in the 1782 edition of A New Law 
Dictionary, the word does not even appear as a legal term.12  The definition of “insanity” in John 
Bouvier’s 1914 law dictionary began with “the prolonged departure, without any adequate cause, 
from the states of feeling and modes of thinking usual to the individual in health.”13  It proceeded 
to continue, citing and analyzing countless legal cases, for the next ten pages.  In another law 
dictionary from 1955, “insanity” was defined simply as “a general word for mental disease, 
incompetence or deficiency.  It includes both lunacy and idiocy.  In criminal proceedings, 
insanity as a defense has been described as a defect of reason, due to disease of the mind, 
preventing the accused from knowing…the fact that it [the act] was wrong.”14  Somehow, in the 
                                                          
10 Ibid., 5.  
 
11 Oxford University Press, Oxford Dictionary, “Insane,” 2019.   
 
12 Giles Jacob and J. Morgan, Esquire, ed.  A New Law Dictionary: Containing the 
Interpretation and Definition of Words and Terms Used in the Law (W. Strahan and W. 
Woodfall, Law-Printers to the King’s Most Excellent Majesty, 1782), 506-509.   
 
13 John Bouvier, Bouvier’s Law Dictionary and Concise Encyclopedia (Kansas City: 
Vernon Law Book Company, 1914), 1589-1600.  
 




forty years between the two law dictionaries, the debate over legal insanity simplified from ten 
pages of analysis to less than fifty words of explanation.   
However, in the 2007 Dictionary of Law Enforcement, the definition of insanity 
expanded yet again to over five hundred words of clarification, analysis, and distinctions 
between different circumstances.15  In this situation, the way insanity has been legally defined 
throughout the centuries can be used as a measurement of how it was viewed by the law 
community.  Events like the Hinckley trial led to another wave of complication regarding the 
legal implications of insanity.  Based on this evolving complexity surrounding the definition of 
insanity, legal or otherwise, the view expressed by Clevenger was clearly valid.  The United 
States may not have a firm handle on the scientific concept of madness, but to omit it from legal 
proceedings entirely was a disservice to the mentally ill community.  
Contrary to this viewpoint, William J. Winslade and Judith Wilson Ross quite 
unsurprisingly made a metaphorical case against the insanity defense entirely in their 1983 book 
The Insanity Plea, published not even a year after Hinckley’s verdict was released.  The 
introduction stated that “law and psychiatry are philosophically incompatible” because while law 
should focus on whether or not an act was committed, a trial based around a plea of insanity asks 
why.16  Because this point-of-view was clearly influenced by the attempted assassination of 
President Ronald Reagan and subsequent trial of John Hinckley that had occurred just two years 
                                                          
15 Graham Gooch and Michael Williams, A Dictionary of Law Enforcement, 1st ed. [book 
on-line] (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, accessed 16 March 2019); available 
from http://www.oxfordreference.com.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/view/10.1093/acref/9780192807021.00 
1.0001/acref-9780192807021-e-1655?rskey=clZ7Fm&result=1653; Internet.   
 
16 William J. Winslade and Judith Wilson Ross, The Insanity Plea (New York: C. 




prior, it cannot be ignored as a reflection of intellectual thought.  In the last section of the book, 
Winslade and Ross discussed the problems with the insanity defense that were brought to light 
by Hinckley’s trial: 
1. The philosophical problem of allocating responsibility for 
human actions 
2. The legal problem of defining states of mind that mitigate or 
eliminate imposition of moral guilt 
3. The psychological problem of jurors’ identifying with the 
defendant, being unable to imagine how a fellow human could 
have performed certain acts unless he was crazy, and thus 
excusing and forgiving him 
4. The medical problem of treatment that does not cure but can 
reduce symptoms so that imprisonment achieved under the 
name of institutionalization can no longer be justified because 
of civil rights.17 
 
Based on this analysis, Winslade and Ross looked through several lenses and found 
interdisciplinary issues with the use of the insanity defense.  Juries could not be trusted to 
understand and properly take into account the word of a psychologist without being too easy on 
the criminal.  In this way, they proposed a solution for how the legal system should handle cases 
based on the insanity defense instead of simply acquitting defendants.  They argued that each case 
should have two phases, the first of which determining whether or not the defendant committed 
the act for which they were on trial, regardless of mental state.  If the defendant was found guilty 
of committing the act, the second phased “would address itself to the appropriate disposition of 
the defendant.”18  This theoretically allowed criminals to be adequately punished while still 
making room for mental illness treatment when necessary.   
                                                          
17 Ibid, 183.  
 




 In Herbert Fingarette’s 1972 book The Meaning of Criminal Insanity, he demonstrated a 
pre-Hinckley-trial point of view of the insanity defense.  Though the book was more focused on 
the general intersections between psychiatry and law, he stated that “an adequately precise 
definition of insanity—one which is also thoroughly realistic from the standpoint of case law and 
legal theory— is possible.”19  This demonstrated Fingarette’s willingness to accept the use of the 
insanity plea, though this book focused more on the general implications rather than specific cases.  
However, it should also be acknowledged that neither the attempted Reagan assassination nor the 
subsequent trial of John Hinckley had occurred when The Meaning of Criminal Insanity was 
published, demonstrating the acceptance of the insanity defense before the 1980s.   
 Fingarette’s view of the Durham Rule was stated in the last section of the book, titled 
“Some Implications of the Formulation:”  
As for the Durham approach, it seems to me that, if the main 
language of the formula is to be retained and if one also accepts the 
analysis I have presented, what is called for is (1) an explicit 
interpretation of the phrase ‘mental disease’ to mean ‘a mental 
makeup such that there is substantial defect in capacity for rational 
conduct with respect to the criminality of the conduct,’ and (2) a 
change or reinterpretation of the word ‘product…’20 
 
Based on this interpretation, this author clearly had a more Progressive view of the future of the 
criminal justice system’s treatment of the mentally ill.  He knew that as long as the Durham Rule 
became more specific, or was replaced by a more specific and easily measurable alternative, there 
was no reason for the use of the insanity defense to be discontinued.  Related to terminology, 
                                                          
19 Herbert Fingarette, The Meaning of Criminal Insanity. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, 
London: Univ. of California Press, 1974), 1-2. 
 
20 Fingarette, 245. 
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Fingarette specifically had a problem with the use of the word “product” in the Durham Rule in 
the sense of the criminal act being “the product of mental disease or defect.”21  This was viewed 
as vague and “insistently casual,” as well as generally unhelpful in determining the validity of the 
insanity defense for most cases, as it is difficult to prove whether or not a mental disease was the 
cause of a crime, or even if the defendant had a mental disease when the crime took place.22  
However, Fingarette’s optimism in relation to the insanity defense was in distinct contrast to the 
points of view of Winslade and Ross. 
 In the case of United States v. Hinckley, John Hinckley was found not guilty by reason of 
insanity for attempting to assassinate President Ronald Reagan and shooting three other men.23  
This ruling infuriated many citizens of the United States due to the seeming lack of controversy 
regarding the crime.  It was upsetting to many Americans that someone could attempt to kill the 
President yet be considered not guilty.  A New York Times reporter named Stuart Taylor, Jr. 
interviewed Senator Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican, and Alan Dershowitz, a 
professor at the Harvard Law School regarding this public outrage in June 1982.  In spite of their 
spirited and thoughtful discussion of the factors involved in the trial decision, both men 
concluded that they believed a guilty vote was necessary if they had been on the jury of the 
Hinckley trial.24  Both men recounted the problematic aspects of the insanity defense, given its 
                                                          
21Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954) 
22 Fingarette, 248. 
 
23 United States v. Hinckley, 529 F. Supp. 520 (D.D.C. 1982) 
 
24 “Hinkley (sic) Verdict Tested More Than the Jury,” New York Times, CXXXI: 45,357 




subjectivity and the control of the defense and prosecution over the witnesses.  Dershowitz 
remarked that “juries do not understand current insanity formulations,” bringing attention to the 
procedures of the trial in general and seemingly questioning whether or not a jury could be 
trusted to make a valid decision.25  As this interview took place a mere week after the Hinckley 
trial verdict was released, the effects on the American public are distinctly visible.  Even experts 
in their fields were forced to question all they knew about criminal proceedings.  Though this 
was not the first time the validity of the insanity defense was called into question, it was 
significant and illustrative of the shift from the past several decades.  
 At first glance, this shift did not make much sense, as the United States has generally 
grown more knowledgeable and accepting about mental illness, and mental health in general.  
However, the actual procedures related to those found not guilty due to the insanity defense did 
shift throughout these years, specifically due to the Mental Health Act of 1980 that was passed 
during President Jimmy Carter’s term in office.  This Act stated that “The Congress finds… the 
shift in emphasis from institutional care to community-based care has not always been 
accompanied by a process of affording training, retraining, and job placement for employees 
affected by institutional closure and conversion.”26  In addition to acknowledging the faults of 
mental health treatment in the United States,  the act provided grants for community mental 
health centers and the addition of mental health services in health care centers, specifically 
recognizing the importance of attention for chronic mental illnesses, mentally ill children, and 
                                                          
25 Ibid.  
 
26 United States 96th Congress, Mental Health Systems Act, (Public Law 96-398), 42 USC 




the elderly.27  This wave of mental health reform was the main cause for the seemingly 
backwards shift in acceptance of the insanity plea.  Because being found not guilty for reasons of 
insanity in the 1950s usually still meant a “life sentence” in an underfunded and understaffed 
mental institution, the American public had an incentive to acquit defendants using the insanity 
plea.  Those seen as dangerous criminals were not in prison, but they were still be kept separate 
from the rest of society, so the end goal of imprisonment was still achieved.  One of these 
criminals confined to an institution after being found not guilty by reason of insanity was John 
Schrank, a bartender who shot President Theodore Roosevelt during a 1912 speech in 
Milwaukee, Wisconsin.28  When doctors found him insane before his trial, Schrank was 
sentenced to life in the Central State Mental Institution in Waupun, Wisconsin.  He lived there 
for 29 years until he passed away in 1943.  However, once medical professionals learned more 
about mental illness and treatment for the mentally ill became more centered on care than on 
institutionalization and invasive surgeries, acquittal by the insanity plea was no longer enough of 
a punishment for the American public.   
 This idea was supported by Harvard Professor Alan A. Stone’s 1982 article “The Insanity 
Defense on Trial.”29  Not only did Stone claim that the improvement in mental health procedures 
was the reason behind the shift in society’s view of the insanity defense, but he stated it was the 
reason for his own belief that the insanity defense should be abolished: “The law created by the 
civil libertarians and the methods of treatment developed by psychiatrists now push in the same 
                                                          
27 Ibid.  
 
28 William S. Crotty, “Presidential Assassinations,” Society, 9:7 (May 1972), 105.   
 
29 Alan A. Stone, “The Insanity Defense on Trial,” Harvard Law School Bulletin, 33:1 




direction, and the traditional way of dealing with persons found not guilty by reason of insanity 
has been drastically transformed.”30  Because this article was written in 1982, a year after the 
Hinckley assassination attempt, the effects of the trial on his viewpoint were clearly visible.   
While Stone’s ideas went another step in using this shift as evidence that the insanity defense 
was outdated and no longer a valid option given the climate of legal procedure, his point 
completely agreed with the those of American society at the time; he was simply more self-
aware.   
However, back in the 1950s when the Durham Rule was written, the shift in treatment of 
mental illness had not yet occurred.  Because the early twentieth century ideas surrounding 
mental health were centered around prevention rather than treatment, invasive, preemptive 
procedures became the norm.  Connecticut was the first state to mandate sterilization of 
“epileptics, imbeciles, and the feeble-minded” after recommendation from a board of experts in 
1907, and thirty-three states passed similar laws.31  In 1954, there were 634,000 mental hospitals 
in the United States, though this number began to drop with the introduction of tranquilizers like 
Thorazine, which allowed patients to be treated (or ignored) more easily in an outpatient setup.32 
The poor living conditions and understaffing in institutionalized mental health care had created 
an incredibly unhealthy environment.  The lobotomy, a surgery that severed neural pathways in 
                                                          
30 Ibid., 20. As quoted in: Phillip E. Johnson, “The Turnabout in the Insanity Defense,” 
Crime and Justice 6 (1985), 225-226.  
 
31 Zeb Larson, “America’s Long-Suffering Mental Health System,” Origins: Current 
Events in Historical Perspective, 11:7 (April 2018).   
 
32 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign 
Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry (New York: Basic Books, 1982). as quoted in: 





the brain, was a practice that was intended to calm mental patients (or make them easier to 
manage); however, the procedure was very dangerous, and a botched attempt could damage a 
patient’s mental capability for life.  Rosemary Kennedy, the sister of John F. Kennedy, 
underwent a secret lobotomy at the insistence of her father in 1943 that left her unable to walk, 
speak, or take care of herself.33  Another popular mental health treatment, mainly used for 
schizophrenia, was insulin coma therapy.  This procedure involved doctors injecting patients 
with insulin because they believed “large fluctuations in insulin levels could alter the function of 
the brain.”34  Causing temporary comas and seizures, the use of this treatment was intended for 
subduing patients and making them easier to work with rather than legitimately helping them 
combat their mental conditions.  Insulin coma therapy was brought to the United States by a 
German neurologist named Manfred Sakel in the 1930s, and the practice remained popular into 
the fifties before being replaced by other trends.  Though these procedures were not always 
common for very long, they were demonstrative of the lack of safety, regulation, and proper care 
present in mental institutions during this time period. 
 Due to these conditions, being found not guilty by reason of insanity during the 1950s 
was still a punishment in some form, and American society accepted it as an option for the 
mentally ill.  It was only when the treatments for those suffering with mental disorders improved 
that acquittal for the insanity plea became objectively better than going to prison, and it was for 
this reason that Americans changed their mind.  While the publicity and political importance of 
Hinckley’s assassination attempt certainly contributed to the outrage surrounding his sentence, 
                                                          
33 Niall O’Dowd, “Remembering the Sad and Dreadful Life of Rosemary Kennedy on 
Anniversary of her Death,” IrishCentral (January 7, 2019).   
34 Tricia Hussung, “A History of Mental Illness Treatment,” Concordia University St. 
Paul, (October 16, 2016).   
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there were also legitimate policy-related reasons behind this reaction.  The United States’ 
mindset is very focused on justice; the law and Constitution are seen as binding aspects of 
culture that, while vaguely malleable, should remain mostly set in stone to give citizens some 
connection to each other and the history of the country.  Perhaps a fitting maxim for the United 
States would be the Latin “Sed lex dura lex: It is harsh, but it is the law.”  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
